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A DELICATE ASSIGNMENT: THE REGULATION
OF ACCOUNTANTS BY THE SEC*
ROBERTA S. KAR EL * *
The Securities and Exchange Commission, the arm of the fcderal gorcernm ent
charged with regulating accounting, has been criticizcd both for acting too timidly
and for acting too vigorously in carrying out its mandate. In this Article, the author
attempts to clarify the role of the SEC in regulating the accounting profession. In so
doing, she examines regulation of both accounting principles and auditing stan-
dards.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant and difficult responsibilities of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC or the Commission) is
the regulation of accountants. Although accountancy' is a learned
profession that ought to engender the same respect and legal protec-
tion as any other profession, accountants have historically been regu-
lated somewhat differently from their professional peers. This discrep-
ancy in treatment can be explained, in part, by accountants'
independence from their clients.2
Although accountants serve the particular enterprises that retain
them, their work is intended for the use and benefit of third parties
who have an interest in the financial statements of those enterprises.
The opinion of certified public accountants attached to the financial
statements of an enterprise is a representation to the users of such
financial statements that the statements have been prepared in con-
formity with generally accepted accounting principles and audited in
conformity with generally accepted auditing standards. 3
* Adapted from the book Regulation by Prosecution: The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission vs. Corporate America, by Roberta S. Karmel. Copyright ( 1982 by Roberta S. Karmel.
Reprinted by permission of Simon & Schuster.
- Member, New York Bar. A.B., 1959, Radcliffe College, LL.B., 1962, New York Univer-
sity. The author was a Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1977-
1980.
1 Accountancy is the body of principles and standards by which financial information is
presented. For a more comprehensive definition, see P. Grady, Accounting Research Study No.
7, Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for Business Enterprises 4 (1965).
2 This independence has been viewed as an affirmative duty that the accountant owes to
the public. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 122
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); see Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37
S.E.C. 629, 670 (1957).
3 See T. Fiflis & H. Kripke, Accounting for Business Lawyers 645-46 (2d ed. 1977).
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Accounting is an international business language that must fol-
low uniform conventions in order to be useful either to particular
business enterprises or to the public. Uniform auditing standards and
accounting principles are necessary for government, business, and
labor to understand and assess the strengths and weaknesses of the
economy and the entities that comprise it. This does not mean that the
language of accounting is merely economic and objectively verifiable.
To the contrary, accounting is becoming more and more subjective,
political, and capable of being manipulated to achieve particular
objectives. In the absence of some form of government regulation, it
would not be possible to achieve or assure an acceptable stan-
dard of uniformity in either auditing standards or accounting prin-
ciples.
The government wields critical power in its control over the
language by which corporate America reports its successes and fail-
ures. The SEC is the only arm of the federal government that has been
given the mandate to regulate accounting, but the extent of the Com-
mission's authority to do so is unclear. This has left the Commission
vulnerable to the contradictory criticisms that it (1) has acted too
timidly and thereby been co-opted by the accounting profession and
(2) that it has acted too vigorously and thereby exceeded its jurisdic-
tional authority.
Despite the current trend toward deregulation, I do not believe
that it would be either feasible or prudent for the federal government
to relinquish its responsibility to regulate accounting. Further, in
order to avoid undue politicization of accounting principles and au-
diting standards, an independent agency should continue to regulate
accounting. The Commission should also continue to involve the pri-
vate sector in the regulatory process, since it would otherwise lack the
expertise needed to resolve the critical and difficult problems facing
accountants and their clients. Maintaining this delicate balance be-
tween public and private sector responsibility has never been easy. In
fact, during the 1970's, the SEC's regulatory relationship with the
accounting profession was severely tested and at times seemed almost
at a breaking point.
This Article will explicate that crisis in the hope that we are
entering a period of decreased confrontation between government and
business. Perhaps in a calmer time of greater cooperation, a sounder
regulatory structure can be created for the future regulation of ac-
countants-regulation that will protect the public against fraudulent
financial statements without subjecting accountants to excessive gov-
ernment regulation or undue civil liability.
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I
THE POLIICAL CRISIS
During the late seventies, policymakers had particular difficulty
formulating proper policies with respect to the regulation of account-
ants. This difficulty was exacerbated by the fact that the accounting
profession was caught in a crisis of conflicting public policies. On the
one hand, the consumerism that flowered in the 1960's continued to
influence public opinion, leading to increased pressures for greater
professional accountability. Until at least 1977, Congress and the
courts were busy formulating more rigorous legal standards for assess-
ing accountants' liability to users of financial reports. 4 On the other
hand, the simultaneous growth of an antiregulatory attitude made
Congress unreceptive to, and the SEC wary about, new ideas and
laws for government-mandated regulation of the accounting profes-
sion. In addition, the appellate courts began to reject some of the
more tenuous theories of accountants' liability, for example, requiring
intentional or reckless misconduct to be a predicate for accountants'
liability under the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act.5
The accounting profession was blamed for the creative account-
ing which led to the collapse of many of the companies whose secu-
rities were the "high flyers" of the bull market of the 1960's.6 The
4 See, e.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding defendant accounting firm liable
under federal and state securities laws as well as common law fraud to purchasers of securities
who relied on misleading financial reports). One commentator believes that, at a minimum, the
district court's decision "stands for the proposition that qualifications in [accountants] opinions
may be insufficient n6tice of the defects to which they relate." Slain, Fair Presentation, 8 Rev.
Sec. Reg. 983, 985 (1975). See generally Note, Accountants Liability for Negligence-A Con-
temporary Approach for a Modern Profession, 48 Fordham L. Rcv. 401, 419 (1979). The
congressional response to these developments is discussed throughout this Article.
5 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j)(b) (1976); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Although the Supreme Court held that a private civil action for
damages cannot be maintained under rule lOb-5 in the absence of scienter, id. at 193, the
opinion explicitly noted that there was no need to "address here the question whether, in some
circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability," id. at 193 n.12. Since Hoch-
.elder, the courts in seven circuits have ruled that recklessness meets the scienter requirements.
E.g., Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709, 715 (5th Cir. 1980); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball &
Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332., 1337 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978). See Dondanville, Defending Accountan& Liability:
Trends and Implications, 15 Forum 173, 188 (1979).
6 See Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties, 26 Vand.
L. Rev. 31 (1975). See also Subcomm. on Governmental Efficiency and the District of Columbia
of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Oversight of the Account-
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accounting profession was also blamed for the business scandals of the
post-Watergate period, most notably illegal political contributions
and questionable foreign payments.7  Congress and the SEC ex-
pressed a self-righteous dissatisfaction with the performance of the
profession in not detecting management misconduct during the audit
process, and proposed more rigorous regulation. This mood led to the
enactment of the bookkeeping and internal accounting control provi-
sions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.8
At the same time, however, skepticism about the government's
ability to improve matters was deepening. Because the public did not
seem to have any more trust and confidence in the government than in
the accounting profession, the problem of generating renewed trust
and confidence in the reliability of audited financial information
became acute. Both the SEC and the accounting profession were
confused and uncertain about what to do. Perhaps because self-regu-
lation had been a part of securities regulation for so long, the Com-
mission, under the leadership of Chairman Harold M. Williams, ad-
vocated self-regulation as a political compromise between those
activist proponents of more direct government regulation of account-
ants and those who strongly resisted all such proposals.9
After forty years of neglect, the structure and regulation of the
accounting profession became the subject of intense congressional
ing Profession 2 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter Oversight Report]; Subcomm. on Covernmen.
tal Efficiency and the District of Columbia of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., Securities and Exchange Commission Report to Congress on the Accounting
Profession and the Commission's Oversight Role 1-2, 151 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter 1978
SEC Report to Congress]; Subcomm. on Reports, Accounting & Management of the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Improving the Accountability of
Publicly Owned Corporations and their Auditors 1, 2 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter Metcalf
Report]; Reform and Self-Regulation Efforts of the Accounting Profession: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978) (hereinafter Moss Hearings].
See S. Rep. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 4098, 4104-06; 1978 SEC Report to Congress, supra note 6, at 2-3, 151; id. app. II, at
1196; Metcalf Report, supra note 6, at 1, 2; Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Federal Regulation and Regulatory Re-
form, H.R. Doe. No. 134, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1976) [hereinafter Moss Report]; Moss
Hearings, supra note 6, at 1.
8 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. IV 1980)); see S. Rep. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7-8, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4098, 4104.
1 Subcomm. on Governmental Efficiency and the District of Columbia of the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Securities and Exchange Commission
Report to Congress on the Accounting Profession and the Commission's Oversight Role 297-327
(Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter 1979 SEG Report to Congress]; Moss Hearings, supra note 6, at
363 (statement of Harold Williams, Chairman of the SEC).
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scrutiny during the mid-1970's. Despite governmental ambivalence
toward the regulation of accountants, there was a much greater direct
federal interest in financial reporting than had previously existed.
Substantial federal assistance to failing or failed corporations such as
Penn Central Corporation and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, as
well as greater involvement by private sector accounting firms in
public sector accounting, helped to precipitate congressional in-
quiry.10 Both the 1976 Subcommittee on Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
chaired by Congressman John Moss," and the 1977 Subcommittee on
Reports, Accounting and Management of the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, chaired by Senator Lee Metcalf,12 undertook
an extensive examination of the accounting profession. Congress was
very critical of the process by which accounting standards were set
and enforced within the profession1 3 and of the domination by the
"Big Eight" accounting firms.14
Although the Metcalf Subcommittee staff had recommended
broad federal involvement in the regulation of accountants,1 5 during
hearings held by the Subcommittee the accounting profession pledged
to institute reforms in the profession and the SEC pledged to use its
oversight role to encourage the private sector's efforts.' On the basis
of these assurances, the Metcalf Subcommittee's report endorsed re-
form through self-initiated action by the profession in cooperation
with the Commission. 17  The Subcommittee's decision to give the
profession and the Commission some time to implement the regula-
tory structure underscored the need for change in order to increase the
public's confidence in the independence of accounts. After Senator
Metcalf's death, this generally critical scrutiny of SEC regulation of
accountants was continued under the direction of Senator Thomas
10 See 1978 SEC Report to Congress, supra note 6, at 2-3; Metcalf Report, supra note 6, at I:
Staff of the Subcomm. on Reports, Accounting and Management of the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., The Accounting Establishment 2 (Comm. Print
1976) [hereinafter Establishment Report]; Accounting and Auditing Practices and Procedures:
Hearings Before the Subeomm. on Reports, Accounting and Management of the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1977) [hereinafter Metcalf Hearings].
" See Moss Report, supra note 7.
12 See Metcalf Report, supra note 6.
13 See 1978 SEC Report to Congress, supra note 6, at 3-4; Metcalf Report, supra note 6, at 7,
8.
14 See Metcalf Report, supra note 6, at 17-18; Establishment Report, supra note 10, at 19.
43-46.
Is See Metcalf Report, supra note 6, at 20-21, 22; Establishment Report, supra note 10, at
20-24.
'6 See Metcalf Report, supra note 6, at 4.
'7 Id.
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Eagleton. 18 Among other things, the Commission agreed to make an
annual report to Congress on its oversight role.19
During the House Oversight Subcommittee hearings in 1978,
Congressman Moss repeated his intention to "introduce legislation to
create a self-regulatory organization under direct SEC oversight" if
the accounting profession did not "adduce persuasive evidence that it
is taking effective steps on its own to improve the quality of audit
work and the responsiveness of accountants to public needs."20 This
legislation was then unveiled as the "Public Accounting Regulatory
Act." 2' 1 The Moss bill proposed a self-regulatory organization for
accountants patterned after the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) .22 It would require registration with this self-regula-
tory organization by accounting firms that audit financial statements
filed with the Commission and would authorize disciplinary action
against the registered firms and their principals. 23
One of the findings set forth in the Moss bill was that the profes-
sion "appears unable to establish a satisfactory self-regulatory
arrangement."'2 4  But the Commission repeatedly expressed the view
that although legislation might be necessary if the profession was
unable to develop an effective self-regulatory structure, the profession
should be given time to develop its own structure. Experience with
self-regulation would enable revisions and improvements to the sys-
tem and provide the Commission and Congress with enough informa-
tion to better judge the need for greater federal involvement through
legislation.2 5
1S See 1979 SEC Report to Congress, supra note 9, at 1; 1978 SEC Report to Congress, supra
note 6, at 3.
19 See Subcomm. on Governmental Efficiency and the District of Columbia of the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Securities and Exchange Commission
Report to Congress on the Accounting Profession and the Commission's Oversight Role at tv
(Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter 1980 SEC Report to Congress]; 1979 SEC Report to Congress,
supra note 9, at 2; 1978 SEC Report to Congress, supra note 6, at 471; Metcalf Report, supra
note 6, at 21.
20 Moss Hearings, supra note 6, at 2 (statement of Subcomm. Chairman John Moss).
21 H.R. 13,175, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 Cong. Rec. H5746 (daily ed. June 16, 1978),
reprinted in Moss hearings, supra note 6, at 536.
22 Id.; see 1978 SEC Report to Congress, supra note 6, at 2; Moss Hearings, supra note 6, at
2. For a description of the organization and activities of the NASD, see 2 L. Loss, Securities
Regulation ch. 8C, at 1365-89 (2d ed. 1961).
23 H.R. 13,175, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 Cong. Rec. H5746 (daily ed. June 16, 1978),
reprinted in Moss Hearings, supra note 6, at 536.
2, Id. § 2(a)(3).
25 See 1980 SEC Report to Congress, supra note 19, at 1-4, 18-21: 1979 SEC Report to
Congress, supra note 9, at vii-ix, 2-8, 28-37, 99-142, 302-03; 1978 SEC Report to Congress, supra
note 6, at 5-7, 15-27, 44-47, 471.
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There are two different ways in which the accounting profession
has traditionally engaged in self-regulation to formulate and enforce
professional standards. One is the development of accounting princi-
ples; the other is the development of auditing standards.20- From the
beginning, the SEC has deferred to usual and customary business
practices of issuers and their auditors in articulating accounting prin-
ciples and auditing standards. Since 1973, authoritative accounting
principles have been formulated and articulated by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 27 Since 1977, professional dis-
cipline and the enforcement of auditing standards primarily through
practice standards and peer reviews have been the responsibility of the
SEC Practice Section of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) Division for CPA firms.28
In a memorandum submitted to the Metcalf Subcommittee, the
SEC stated that it had "sufficient authority to oversee the setting of
auditing and accounting standards, effect registration and financial
disclosure by accounting firms, review the work of independent audi-
tors and discipline those which do not meet minimum standards, and
subpoena information from uncooperative accounting firms."29 Per-
sonally, I regard this analysis as a prosecutor's brief, and believe that
the nature and extent of the SEC's authority to regulate accountants is
unclear in many significant respects. Although the SEC has ample
plenary power to establish accounting principles, its power to enforce
auditing standards is much more questionable.
II
THE REGULATION OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
When Congress was debating passage of the Securities Act of
1933,30 certain congressmen proposed that a corps of government
auditors be established to audit public companies. 31 Representatives
of the accounting profession and others, however, urged Congress to
reject this proposal and rely instead on the private sector to perform
" See T. Fiflis & H. Kripke, supra note 3, at 64546, for an explanation of the relationship
between the two: auditing standards are those procedures of quality of performance to be
followed by the independent auditor in determining whether the statements in question have
been prepared in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles consistently applied.
27 See Strother, The Establishment of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and Gener-
ally Accepted Auditing Standards, 28 Vand. L. Rev. 201, 219-20 (1975).
2' See text accompanying notes 61-63 infra.
2 Metcalf Report, supra note 6, at 20.
30 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
"' See, e.g., Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (remarks of Sen. Adams), 57-59 (remarks of Sen. Reynolds) (1933).
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this function. 32  Accordingly, Congress required that financial state-
ments filed with the SEC be certified by an independent certified or
public accountant, and gave the Commission power to prescribe the
detail and content of such financial statements.3 3  In addition, the
SEC was empowered to define the "accounting, technical, and trade
terms, used in [the statute and to] prescribe the form . . . in which
required information shall be set forth, the items .. to be shown in
the balance sheet and earning statement, and the methods to be
followed in the preparation of accounts. 3 4
The Commission has adopted Regulation S-X, and similar regu-
lations to implement these provisions. 3  Nevertheless, the Commis-
sion has also assigned considerable responsibility for formulating new
accounting principles to private sector organizations, specifically the
FASB and its predecessors. This has been accomplished by providing
that "principles, standards and practices promulgated by the
FASB... will be considered by the Commission as having substan-
tial authoritative support, and those contrary to such FASB promulga-
tions will be considered to have no such support. ' 3  The theory
underlying SEC reliance on the FASB is that the accounting profes-
sion has greater resources, expertise, and ability to detect emerging
accounting problems at an earlier stage than does the Commission.
This relationship has been attacked, however, notably by Professor
32 See, e.g., id. at 56-62 (testimony of Col. A.M. Carter, President of the New York Society
of Certified Public Accountants).
3' See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, Schedule A, Items 25-27, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 77aa, Schedule A, Items 25-27 (1976)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, §§
12(b)(1)(J), 12(b)(1)(K), 13(a), 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b)(1)(J), 781(b)(1)(K),
78m(a) (1976)); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, § 14, 49 Stat. 803
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 79n (1976)); Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 30(e), 54 Stat.
789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 80a-29(e) (1976)).
3 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 19(a), 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1976)).
Similar authority is found in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 13(b), 48 Stat. 881
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (1976)) and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
ch. 687, § 20(a), 54 Stat. 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 79t(a) (1976)).
35 See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (1981) (independence and good standing requirements); Id. §
210.2-02 (requirements concerning audit representations and opinions); id. § 210.4 (general rules
of form, content, and method of presentation of financial statements); id. § 256 (prescribing an
accounting system to be used by certain types of companies); id. § 257 (regulations concerning
the preservation of books and records).
38 Accounting Series Release No. 150, 39 Fed. Reg. 1260 (1974), 3 S.E.C. Docket 275
(1973-1974). This policy reaffirmed a policy taken in Accounting Series Release No. 4, 11 Fed.
Reg. 10,912, 10,913 (1938), 5 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,005, wherein the presumption that
"financial statements ... prepared in accordance with accounting principles for which there Is
no substantial authoritative support [were] misleading or inaccurate" was first announced.
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Homer Kripke, as an unlawful delegation of government power pur-
suant to which the regulators have been co-opted by the regulated.37
This charge bothered me a great deal when I was on the Com-
mission because I felt it had some merit. Yet I was convinced that a
corps of government accountants would not have the flexibility or
insight to serve adequately the needs of the capital markets in develop-
ing and adapting accounting principles. I was thus keenly aware of
the significance of the Commission's action in mandating the develop-
ment of "reserve recognition accounting" for oil and gas companies,38
thereby overturning the FASB's determination that oil and gas com-
panies should follow the "successful efforts" method of accounting. 39
The Commission's decision proved impossible to implement, and the
SEC was forced to return the burden of developing practical value-
based accounting disclosures for gas and oil companies to the FASB. 40
The SEC's original action in overturning the FASB's determina-
tion in this instance raises another useful point. Despite the difficult
political and accounting questions involved in determining an appro-
priate method of accounting for oil and gas reserves, I believed that
the Commission's admittedly controversial decision was very healthy
for the SEC's long-term relationship with the accounting profession.
Even if the Commission's decision was wrong on the merits, I would
defend it on the ground of political sagacity. On the one hand, the
Commission demonstrated that it has both the final responsibility for
rules governing financial data prepared to comply vith the securities
laws, and the capability to exercise effective oversight of FASB stand-
ard setting. On the other hand, since the SEC's oil and gas reserve
recognition accounting decision was made pursuant to the peculiar
provisions of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975,41 the
Commission was able to assure the accounting profession that it had
not embarked on a campaign to change the SEC's longstanding reli-
ance on the private sector for standard setting. 42
37 See H. Kripke, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure: Regulation in Search of a Purpose
150-51 (1979).
38 Accounting Series Release No. 253, 43 Fed. Reg. 40,688, 40,6S8, 40,712 (1978) (current
version at 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-10 (1981)).
w See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 19, Financial Accounting and Reporting by Oil and Gas Producing Companies (1977).
40 See Accounting Series Release No. 289, 46 Fed. Reg. 15,496 (19S1).
41 42 U.S.C. § 6383 (1976).
42 In fact, the SEC stated in its 1979 Report to Congress that -It]he fact that the Commission
reached an independent judgment in this particular proceeding which differed from that of the
FASB does not represent any change in the Commissions basic policy of looling to the FASB for
the initiative in establishing and improving accounting standards." 1979 SEC Report to Con-
gress, supra note 9, at 50.
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Very shortly after the SEC's decision concerning the appropriate
method of oil and gas accounting, the Commission reverted to Its
more customary role by relying upon the FASB to develop accounting
principles that reflected the impact of inflation and changing
prices. 43 Even in this instance, however, the FASB's action, which
the SEC deemed an adequate response to a very troublesome prob-
lem, came only after the SEC proposed its own rules.4 4 The general
SEC support for the work of the FASB reflected by the inflation
accounting example is extremely important because of the FASB's
ongoing work in developing a much needed conceptual framework for
addressing accounting problems. 45
III
THE REGULATION OF AUDITING STANDARDS
Although the legal framework and SEC-FASB working relation-
ship for the accounting principle setting process is well established,
surveillance of auditing practices and standards is another story.
Here, the SEC and the AICPA are working hard to erect an appropri-
ate regulatory structure. In my opinion, however, this is a house of
cards that could well be toppled unless supportive congressional
action is taken. Auditing standards for accountants who certify finan-
cial statements filed with the SEC are indirectly regulated by the
Commission, primarily through enforcement proceedings. 46 There
As an aside, let me note that I regarded the political atmosphere in which this decision was
made as extremely dangerous for the SEC and the private sector standard setters. The manner In
which those oil companies committed to either "successful efforts" or "full cost" accounting
managed to lobby the Congress to exert pressure on the Commission's decisionmaking process
exemplified the value of maintaining independence in a regulatory agency with respect to
certain kinds of technical policymaking decisions. I hope that it will be a long time before
another accounting issue becomes so improperly politicized.
41 See Accounting Series Release No. 271, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,888 (1979) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 210.4-09 (1981)) (deleting regulation requiring disclosure of current replacement cost data In
financial statements since the FASB had adopted such a requirement).
44 Accounting Series Release No. 190, 41 Fed. Reg. 13,596 (1976) (previously codified at 17
C.F.R. § 210.4-09 (1981)). The SEC rule required that disclosure of current replacement cost be
made in a footnote to the financial statements.
41 See 1980 SEC Report to Congress, supra note 19, at 50-59; 1979 SEC Report to Congress,
supra note 9, at 43-45, 188; 1978 SEC Report to Congress, supra note 6, at 30-31, 278-80.
4' Accountants are licensed and directly regulated, however, under state law. Although
there is a uniform CPA exam, "standards for entrance differ widely [among states] and virtually
no mechanism exists for policing professionals on a post-entrance basis." Burton, The Professlon's
Institutional Structure in the 1980's, J. Accountancy, Apr. 1978, at 63, 66. A disciplinary
mechanism is being developed by the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA and the Public
Oversight Board, with the support and encouragement of the SEC. See text accompanying notes
60-66 infra.
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are two major weaknesses in the disciplinary mechanisms for account-
ants who practice before the SEC. The first is the lack of clear SEC
authority to discipline accountants. The second is the lack of any legal
authority outside the securities laws to compel accountants to adhere
to auditing standards enunciated by either the AICPA or the SEC.
The SEC has long disciplined accountants and accounting firms
under rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice.47  That rule
purports to give the Commission authority to discipline and sanction
"'any person" by means of a suspension or a permanent bar from
practicing before the Commission, if that person is found:
(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, or
(ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in
unethical or improper professional conduct, or (iii) to have will-
fully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any
provision of the Federal securities lawvs.... or the rules and
regulations thereunder. 4
8
These are very general and amorphous standards. Some are ethi-
cal, such as integrity, character, and improper professional conduct.
Another relates to competence: the qualifications to represent others.
Another is a legal concern: willful violation of the federal securities
laws, Further, the rule does not distinguish between discipline as
applied to accountants, attorneys, or any other professionals.
Before I became a Commissioner, as well as during my tenure in
office, I frequently expressed concern about the Commission's use of
rule 2(e) as a general enforcement tool to discipline attorneys.49 Some
of the same questions concerning the Commission's legal authority to
promulgate rule 2(e) and the appropriateness, as a policy matter, of
professional disciplinary power in a prosecutorial agency, are applica-
ble to accountants as well as to attorneys. I believe, however, that the
Commission does have a stronger basis for asserting administrative
jurisdiction to discipline accountants than lawyers.50 Nevertheless,
since this power is not explicit, it must be implied if it is to be found at
47 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1981).
-" Id. § 201.2(e)(1).
49 See Darrell L. Nielsen, 6 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,297, at 62,782 (1981) (Karmcl, C.,
dissenting); Keating, Muething & Klekamp, [1979] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,124, at 81,992
(Karmel, C., dissenting); Daley & Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of
the SEC, 24 Emory L.J. 747, 762-65, 784-90 (1975).
5 The SEC's authority is greater with regard to accountants since the securities laws explic-
itly give the Commission the power to regulate the form and content of financial statements and
require certification of the statements by a public accountant. See tet accompanying notes 32-34
supra.
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all. Accordingly, such a disciplinary power should be narrowly con-
strued and should be exercised only where improper conduct directly
interferes with the Commission's administration of specifically
granted responsibilities.
I start my analysis with the basic enabling statutes for the regula-
tory work at the SEC, to which any court must refer in determining
the existence and extent of the Commission's authority. No provision
in any of the federal securities laws expressly authorizes the Commis-
sion to discipline accountants administratively. Indeed, federal law
makes the licensing of accountants a state, not federal, function.5 '
Furthermore, the express provisions dealing with accounting, audit-
ing, or accountants in the securities laws are at best ambiguous with
respect to the issue of professional disciplinary authority.
The only express provisions of the securities laws concerning
accounting are those that give the Commission the authority to define
"accounting, technical, and trade terms" and to require that financial
statements filed with the Commission be certified by an independent
public or certified accountant. 52  Whatever authority does exist sim-
ply derives by implication from the general powers given to the Com-
mission to make such rules as may be "necessary" or "appropriate" to
implement the express provisions of the securities laws.1 Thus, the
issue of whether the Commission can discipline an accountant for
defective auditing, when there is no express provision of law giving it
authority over auditing standards or procedures, is a very real one.
The Commission's adoption and utilization of rule 2(e) must be
sustained (if it is indeed sustainable) on the theory that the SEC has
implied authority to proceed against accountants administratively as a
necessary and appropriate corollary to these express statutory provi-
sions. In Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC,5 ' the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit upheld rule 2(e) as a disciplinary tool against account-
ants, as "a necessary adjunct to the Commission's power to protect the
integrity of its administrative procedures and the public in gen-
eral."55 My personal view is that using this implied authority to
"' See Administrative Procedure Act, § 1(1)(A)(c), 5 U.S.C. § 500(c) (1976) ("an individual
who is duly qudified to practice as a certified public accountant in a State may represent a
person before the Internal Revenue Service .... ").
"2 See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
53 E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 23(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1976) ("The
Commission... shall ... have power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary
or appropriate to implement the provisions of this chapter ... ," although no liability may be
imposed for "any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with a rule, regulation, or
order of the [SEC].").
609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 582 (citation omitted).
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discipline accountants by an administrative proceeding is at best a
barely sufficient legal basis for rule 2(e), at least as it is now drafted.
The Second Circuit itself, and Judge Kaufman concurring, in Touche
Ross expressed some doubt as to whether a rule 2(e) case should be
brought against a large firm for the auditing failures of one of its
partners or employees.56 Any use of this regulatory authority, there-
fore, ought to be strictly confined to financial presentation or inde-
pendence requirements.
Further, if the Commission is going to exercise general discipli-
nary authority over accountants, at the very least it ought to concede
or specify the bounds of its authority and articulate the standards it is
using in applying rule 2(e), something it has never done. An inherent
weakness of any implied power is the lack of defined standards. When
the government acts without reference to a regulatory standard which
circumscribes such action, there is always the danger that such action
will be arbitrary or capricious. The effects of such discretionary au-
thority are particularly severe when disciplinary actions are involved.
While there is a tendency to rely on the courts to curb excessive action
by government agencies, it is time that regulators took the initiative in
articulating standards and in exercising self-restraint. This is why I
have advocated that the Commission should discipline an accountant
only where there is a clear and direct link-a nexus-between the
accountant's conduct and the Commission's express authority and its
regulatory processes. The Commission should not be using rule 2(e) as
a general enforcement tool against incompetent or unethical audi-
tors.5
Although the Commission has brought numerous cases against
large accounting firms, it has never taken the pains to articulate the
legal standards by which it has based the imposition of sanctions.5
Lurking in the Commission's decisions and pronouncements is the
notion that an implied representation of quality is made in the ac-
counting firm's certification of financial statements. Yet, judicial deci-
sions requiring scienter in fraud cases5 9 cast doubt on the SEC's ability
r Id. at 582 n.21; id. at 583 & n.1 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
- See Darrell L. Nielsen, 6 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,.297, at 62,782 (1981) (Karmel, C.,
dissenting).
', See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst, 6 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,270, at 62,735-36 (1978);
Touche Ross & Co., 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,175, at 62,360-63 (1974); Touche, Niven,
Bailey & Smart, 5 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,100, at 62,221-22 (1957); Haskins & Sells, 5
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,092, at 62,197 (1952).
59 See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 193 (1976); Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168, 178-79 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980) (scienter required for aiding and abetting liability in action brought
under § 17(e)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § SMa-17(e)(1) (1976)).
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to use this type of a "shingle" theory to impose sanctions without proof
of intentional wrongdoing. If such sanctions are of doubtful validity,
the legality of various compliance procedures imposed by the Com-
mission on accounting firms, such as peer reviews in consent settle-
ments, is even more dubious. For all of these reasons, and because I
believe the Commission has abused whatever powers may justify the
use of rule 2(e) for professional discipline, I think that rule 2(e) is a
poor oversight weapon for the SEC to wield in trying to survey and
improve auditing practice and standards.
In its July 1979 report to Congress on the accounting profession,
the Commission stated that it "continues to believe that the indepen-
dence and professionalism of accountants are critical to the credibility
and usefulness of their reports. Further, the Commission continues to
believe that the initiative for establishing and improving accounting
and auditing standards should remain in the private sector, subject to
Commission oversight."60 At a time when the public generally has
been questioning the validity of increased governmental regulation,
the Commission has been urging that the accounting profession exper-
iment with self-regulation subject to SEC oversight. But in terms of
laying a foundation for the future relationship between the Commis-
sion and the profession, it is important that whatever oversight the
Commission exercises over discipline be on firm legal ground. If the
Commission's authority to act is not clear, its regulation is unlikely to
be effective. Because the Commission's reliance on an implied power
is so equivocal, it is difficult for its professional responsibility program
to be coherent in either objective or implementation under rule 2(e) as
currently drafted.
Furthermore, the Commission has no other authority with which
to discipline accountants directly. This might not be so serious, if the
ability of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for CPA
firms to engage in a program to discipline accountants were resting on
a stronger legal foundation.
The SEC Practice Section was created in response to government
and public criticism of the accounting profession, and was lauded by
the SEC as a major accomplishment towards the development of
self-regulation.61 Membership within the Section is voluntary and
consists principally of firms serving publicly held and other corpora-
tions subject to direct SEC regulation. A Public Oversight Board
serves as an oversight and advisory committee to the Section. The
0 1979 SEC Report to Congress, supra note 9, at 8.
e' See id. at 9, 31, 88, 104-41; 1978 SEC Report to Congress, supra note 6, at 6, 15; Id. § F,
at 1-70.
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Board is composed of distinguished individuals from outside the pro-
fession. Initially, the Chairman of the Board was John J. McCloy, and
two former SEC Chairmen-William Cary and Ray Garrett-were
members. 62 The membership requirements of the SEC Practice Sec-
tion include mandatory peer review, continuing professional educa-
tion, second partner review, audit partner rotation, and an implicit
agreement to cooperate with any disciplinary measures imposed by
the Executive Committee of the Section .3
The manner in which the AICPA set up this new Section was
challenged in a suit filed in January 1978 by eighteen partners and
senior members of small- and medium-sized accounting firms. At the
end of July 1978, New York Supreme Court Justice Kassal ruled that
the AICPA's council had acted within the AICPA bylaws when it
approved the new classifications of groups of members in the organi-
zation.6 Although the decision was welcomed as a significant tri-
umph for the profession's self-regulatory efforts, it did not deal with
potentially more troublesome hurdles to the long-term viability of the
AICPA's self-regulatory scheme under the federal antitrust laws. As
Sandy Burton, former Chief Accountant to the SEC, has pointed out,
the "antitrust laws make it extremely difficult for [any] profession to
develop a process with real disciplinary teeth."0 51 Moreover, the
present legal environment creates difficulties in terms of establishing
an unregulated system that would be beyond attackco
Compulsory membership in the SEC Practice Section of the
AICPA, in conjunction with the power to discipline members, would
basically amount to a combination in restraint of trade under the
federal antitrust laws.6 7  Arguments can be made, however, that
regulation of accountants could be effectively exempted from the
antitrust laws. The powers of an organization such as the SEC Prac-
tice Section might be sustainable, despite antitrust regulations, be-
cause accountancy is a learned profession and because ethical norms
effectuated by disciplinary procedures serve to regulate and promote
_ See 1979 SEC Report to Congress, supra note 9, at 68, 8S-89, 109-24.
See id. at 69-70, 91-93, 125-41; 1978 SEC Report to Congress, supra note 6. § F. at 1-57.
62-70; Moss Hearings, supra note 6, at 15-16, 25-31, 48-56.
" In re Alam, N.Y.L.J. Aug. 2, 1978, at 6, col. 3, 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 1. 1978).
1 Burton, supra note 46, at 66-67.
r Id. at 67.
6 Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); cf. Sugar Inst. v. United States, 297 U.S. 53.
599-602 (1935) (trade group that compelled adherence to advance price announcements, al-
though established to correct industry faults, actually restrained price competition, held viola-
tive of § 1).
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competition.68  A more likely exemption would be implied immunity
from the antitrust laws based on SEC oversight .6  However, in prior
cases in which SEC oversight has been the basis for a limited implied
repeal of the antitrust laws, the Commission has had both the clear
statutory authority to affect or alter the outcome of self-regulatory
action, and it has exercised effective oversight through the use of this
statutory authority. At the present time, the Commission does not
have any direct oversight authority with respect to disciplinary actions
taken by the SEC Practice Section. Therefore, it cannot effectively
assure that the procedures of the AICPA comport with due process, or
that they do not impose any unnecessary or inappropriate burden on
competition.
Of course, since membership in the SEC Practice Section is vol-
untary, the need to formalize SEC oversight in order to achieve
antitrust immunity is still inchoate. Yet, the inability of the AICPA to
bring all firms that do SEC work into the Section is a troublesome
problem. 70  This problem will become more serious if the Section
attempts to discipline any member. Further, if the Section does not
embark on a program to discipline members who do not come up to
standard, its self-regulatory program will not be sufficiently credible
or effective to command the respect of the public.
The conclusions that others have drawn from this kind of analysis
of the difficulties of purely private sector regulation of auditing stand-
ards is that the securities laws should be amended to provide for a
statutorily authorized self-regulatory body subject to direct SEC over-
sight, analogous to the NASD. 71 Although I have considerable sym-
pathy for this proposal, I am very reluctant to urge its adoption. In
large part, this is because I believe that the 1975 Amendments 72 to the
securities acts imposed intolerable legal burdens upon the concept of
self-regulation. These amendments were aimed at giving the SEC
increased power to exercise more effective oversight of the stock ex-
changes and other self-regulating organizations in the securities indus-
8 See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978) (recognizing
that ethical norms which serve to promote competition in a profession may fall within the rule of
reason exception, but rejecting application of that exception to the facts of the case); Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 778 n.7 (1975) (certain public service aspects of the learned
professions may support practices which, in a business context, would be violative of the
Sherman Act).
" United States v. National Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 721-22, 729-301
(1975); Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 685-86 (1975).
70 See 1980 SEC Report to Congress, supra note 19, at 47-49.
71 E.g., Burton, supra note 46, at 67.
72 Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 16, 89 Stat. 146 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78s (1976)).
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try. Nevertheless, the complex and burdensome procedural require-
ments applicable to rulemaking and disciplinary proceedings by
self-regulation militate against creative and flexible regulation.
The accounting profession does not need a more adversarial and
more legalistic relationship with the SEC. Indeed, one of the positive
effects of the joint resistance of the SEC and the accounting profession
to the kind of federal legislation suggested above, and proposed by
Congressman Moss, has been greater understanding and cooperation
between the government and the profession in working toward practi-
cal solutions to current problems.
Yet, I do feel that some clarification of the SEC's disciplinary
power with respect to accountants and accounting firms is in order, if
such a power is to serve as an effective "shotgun in the closet" to
encourage private sector improvements in auditing practices. 73 For
example, the SEC's present authority to proceed against persons who
make false filings with the Commission74 could be enlarged to include
the imposition of specified sanctions against accountants and account-
ing firms. If, at the same time, Congress provided the SEC Section of
the AICPA with some degree of limited immunity under the antitrust
laws, the regulatory burdens that would flow from a scheme of com-
pulsory federal licensing of accountants could perhaps be avoided.
CONCLUSION
Although the political mood of the country shifted in the late
seventies so that the Moss and Metcalf Reports did not result in
remedial federal legislation to regulate the accounting profession, I do
not believe that the federal government's interest in accounting will
diminish. Financial statements are too critical an indicator of eco-
nomic health for the government to lose interest. Moreover, as the
political power of the "Big Eight" accounting firms has grown with
their involvement in auditing the government and multinational en-
terprise, accounting and the regulation of accountants have become
political issues. In addition, public distrust of the accounting profes-
sion continues.
Some of this distrust is the result of frustrated expectations that
never should have been encouraged in the first place. Accounting,
though an international business language, is neither objective nor
exact. The purpose of audits is to enhance the value of financial
73 Further, the SEC's responsibility for formulating auditing standards (without reference to
their enforcement) should be made express.
14 E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (1976): Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, § 8(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(e) (1976).
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information disseminated to external constituencies, and not to pro-
vide a deep pocket to pay investor losses when a corporation fails.
I do not minimize the difficulties that must be surmounted by the
SEC and the accounting profession to regain the public's confidence in
the value and reliability of financial reporting. Yet, such confidence is
an indispensable ingredient of capital formation. If the Commission
would become a more reasonable regulator, perhaps those it regulates
would be less afraid to seek congressional assistance in legitimizing the
Commission's oversight authority. In the case of the regulation of
accountants, the need to utilize the SEC's expertise to enforce and
promote better accounting principles and auditing standards is criti-
cal. As pointed out by one commentator:
Disturbing cross-currents are at work. While a strong push for
greater certainty and uniformity in financial statements is oc-
curing, the uncertain economic atmosphere casts a pall over all
accounting deliberations. Some of the stresses and strains are famil-
iar such as management's desire to put the best face on the com-
pany's financial statements; others are unfamiliar, for example,
double-digit inflation and its implications for an accounting system
grounded on historical cost.75
In this kind of environment, where the public and private sectors
need to better understand the ways in which economic events are
recorded, and to improve methods for such recording, preoccupation
with the imposition of liability for mistakes is counterproductive.
When communications are scrutinized primarily for the purpose of
avoiding potential liability, there is little incentive for creativity. The
challenge of assessing and meeting the needs of the capital markets to
raise capital must assume paramount importance. Throughout the
decade of the seventies the SEC endeavored to conscript accountants
to help enforce the securities laws, an objective that the courts have
begun at least to question. 76  The general governmental attitude on
this subject was probably best expressed in the Metcalf Report as
follows: "Potential legal liability for negligence is the most effective
mechanism for assuring that independent auditors perform their pub-
lic responsibilities competently and diligently. ' 77
I strongly disagree with this conclusion. My own view is that if
the regulators and the regulated are distracted by debates over how to
compensate particular individuals for losses realized in their invest-
" Hawes, Truth in Financial Statements: An Introduction, 28 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1975).
7 See SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1979).
77 Metcalf Report, supra note 6, at 19.
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ments, or how to punish everyone who was possibly responsible for
such losses, the general welfare wil suffer because our society's crea-
tive energies will not be channeled into more productive pursuits.
Furthermore, risk is an inherent element of investment, and the pub-
lic should be educated to understand and accept loss as well as gain in
securities investments. There is an urgent need for the SEC to encour-
age the accounting profession to develop better methods for communi-
cating the accomplishments and vulnerabilities of U.S. business, so
that investors will be able to place capital where it is most needed and
will be most efficiently utilized.
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